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Abstract 
An emerging literature estimates air pollution’s effects on productivity but only for small 
groups of workers of particular occupations or firms. To provide more comprehensive estimates 
necessary for nationwide policy analysis, we estimate effects for a nationally representative 
sample of all of China’s manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2007 and capture all channels by 
which pollution influences productivity. 
We use thermal inversions as an instrument to estimate the causal effect of pollution on 
productivity. A one 𝜇𝜇g/m3 decrease in PM2.5 increases productivity by 0.82% with an elasticity 
of -0.44. Firms respond by hiring more workers attenuating the elasticity of output with respect 
to pollution to -0.17. Using the differential effect of China’s accession into the WTO on coastal 
versus inner regions, we estimate the causal effect of output on pollution (elasticity of 1.43) to 
simulate the dynamic, general-equilibrium effects of PM2.5 yielding an elasticity of -0.31. 
Lowering PM2.5 by 1% nationwide through methods other than reducing manufacturing output 
would generate annual productivity increases of CNY 39.7 thousand for the average firm and 
CNY 6.3 billion or 0.043% of GDP across all firms. 
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1 Introduction 
An emerging literature documents the effect of air pollution on short-run productivity, 
an important driver of economic growth. These papers significantly advance our 
understanding of how pollution affects productivity and convincingly demonstrate that 
air pollution can decrease productivity. However, because these studies utilize detailed 
measures of hourly or daily output per worker, they focus on narrow groups of workers 
in particular occupations such as fruit picking (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2012), garment 
assembly (Adhvaryu et al., 2014), pear packing (Chang et al., 2016), call center services 
(Chang et al., 2019) or textile assembly (He et al., 2019). While these estimates are useful 
for evaluating narrowly-targeted environmental policies or evaluating the costs and 
benefits for certain groups, their external validity is of concern in evaluating broad-
based pollution reduction policies. 
We provide comprehensive, nationwide causal estimates of air pollution’s effect on 
short-run productivity for manufacturing firms in China encompassing all channels of 
effects. Using satellite data to measure pollution we are able to consider all firms in 
China’s manufacturing survey in our estimates. The survey includes all state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and all non-SOEs with more than CNY 5 million in annual sales 
rendering evaluations of nationwide environmental policies feasible. Having moved to 
nationwide estimates, it is necessary but challenging to quantify the general-
equilibrium effects taking account of output’s effect on pollution. To do so, we 
supplement the partial-equilibrium estimate with an estimate of the causal effect of 
output on pollution using an instrumental variable approach and then simulate the 
general-equilibrium effects. 
For our partial-equilibrium estimates, we find an elasticity of productivity with respect 
to pollution of -0.44 for particulate matter less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter (PM2.5). 
Holding inputs constant, an increase in PM2.5 by 1% nationwide from sources other than 
manufacturing would decrease the average firm’s output by USD 7.4 (CNY 56.3)1 
thousand and decrease output across all firms by USD 1.2 billion annually (0.060% of 
China’s average gross domestic product (GDP) over the sample period). Firms 
compensate for this productivity loss by hiring more workers which partially offsets it. 
The combined effect of the productivity loss and additional hiring is an elasticity of        
-0.17 for output with respect to pollution. We do not find significant differences in these 
effects between China’s major manufacturing centers and elsewhere. 
We combine this partial-equilibrium estimate with a causal estimate of output’s effect 
on pollution and embed them in an intertemporal general-equilibrium model of China’s 
economy (àla Nordhaus, 1992) to simulate the general equilibrium effects. Calibrating 
                                                          
1 Throughout the paper we measure output by value added and use these terms interchangeably since we 
abstract away from intermediate inputs. A 2007 exchange rate of 7.6 is used throughout the paper. 
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the model to observed values, we find that the effects are amplified when taking 
account of how output effects pollution. A 1% increase in PM2.5 over the sample period 
decreases total output by 0.31% on average over the sample period. Dynamically, the 
effect is greater than the partial-equilibrium effects in the first period of the sample and 
increases over time as capital is accumulated. These are significant effects and can be 
used in cost-benefit analyses of nationwide environmental policies. 
The primary obstacles in estimating pollution’s effect on output are simultaneity and 
omitted-variable biases. Simultaneity bias in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
could result from the production process itself in the absence of any effect of pollution 
on productivity or from compensating actions taken by firms in the presence of such 
effects. In the absence of any effects the more output a region’s firms produce the worse 
its pollution, biasing OLS estimates upward towards or above zero. If pollution lowers 
productivity, this will lower output and pollution biasing OLS estimates downward. 
Bias may also result if firms compensate by substituting to other inputs: upward if these 
other inputs are low-polluting or downward if high-polluting. Omitted variable bias 
could result from region-specific, time-varying correlations between pollution and 
output induced by production decisions, industrial policies, or regulations.2 These 
could bias OLS estimates upward or downward depending on whether low-
productivity regions adopt cleaner or dirtier technologies over time in response to these 
actions. 
Previous papers in this literature maintain exogeneity by using a short time period and 
focusing on one or a few firms which do not materially impact overall pollution levels. 
Estimating with a national sample over a longer period no longer affords this condition. 
To overcome the simultaneity and omitted variables biases while achieving 
comprehensive estimates we employ the number of days with thermal inversions in 
geographic areas corresponding to counties to instrument for pollution. Thermal 
inversions form due to exogenous meteorological factors yet trap pollutants such as 
PM2.5 near the ground degrading air quality. Previous papers using thermal inversions 
as an instrument include Arceo et al. (2016); Hicks et al. (2016); Jans et al. (2018); Sager 
(2019); Chen et al. (2017); Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018). The instrument is highly 
predictive and, when applied, reveals more negative productivity effects than OLS 
estimates. 
A second estimation obstacle is potential spatial sorting across regions of low- versus 
high-skilled workers or low- versus high-polluting firms in response to pollution. Using 
OECD (2011)’s criteria, we classify firms by technology intensiveness and find that 
pollution is not predictive of the year-by-year fraction of employment in low- versus 
high-technology firms across locations suggesting that the migration of workers is 
                                                          
2 Our specification includes firm fixed effects ruling out time-invariant sources of bias. 
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limited in the short run. Few firms move during the sample period consistent with no 
significant sorting by extant firms. Excluding firms that relocate results in greater effects 
on productivity indicating that pollution’s effect may be even greater if these are 
representative of the full sample. Pollution is not predictive of firm entry or exit 
consistent with endogenous choice of entry and exit and survival bias having limited 
effect on our estimates. 
Since previous papers focus on small sets of firms or workers, general-equilibrium 
effects could be ignored. For proper policy analysis, nationwide estimates must 
incorporate the feedback effect of output on pollution. Estimating output’s effect on 
PM2.5 also raises endogeneity issues. Most directly, pollution deters production which 
will bias OLS estimates. Estimates are also affected by all the same simultaneity and 
omitted-variable biases as the estimates for productivity. To address this, we use China 
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 as an exogenous shock to output 
in China’s more-developed coastal regions vis-à-vis its less-developed inner regions. 
This approach is widely used in the trade literature (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005; 
Verhoogen, 2008; Topalova, 2010). We find an elasticity of PM2.5 with respect to output 
of 1.43. This estimate is useful in and of itself as there are few causal estimates of 
output’s effect on pollution. Combining this with our partial-equilibrium estimate of 
pollution’s effect on output, we simulate the general-equilibrium effect of pollution 
using a slightly modified version of the Dynamic-Integrated-Climate-Economy (DICE) 
model of Nordhaus (1992). Using economy-wide data for our sample period and 
parameterizing the production and utility functions with realistic parameters we closely 
match actual output and pollution. From this we simulate counterfactuals quantifying 
pollution’s effect on output incorporating effects on both productivity and labor supply. 
This paper makes three primary contributions. First, we provide nearly exhaustive 
measures for the causal effect of pollution on the short-run productivity of a country’s 
manufacturing sector. Previous studies examine only small sets of workers in particular 
occupations or a small set of firms. An exception is a subsequent paper by 
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018) that examines effects of PM2.5 on GDP and population across 
European regions (roughly counties) using aggregated data. Cost-benefit analyses of 
national environmental policies require comprehensive estimates since effects on 
particular occupations, firms, or industries may be idiosyncratic. We provide such a 
nationwide estimate for China and find larger estimates than previous, more focused 
studies. A possible reason is that we estimate annual cumulative effects rather than 
those of shorter duration; however, this may also relate to the scope of our estimates. 
They reflect all manufacturing industries, firms and occupations rather than specific 
settings and they capture all channels by which productivity is affected including per-
hour productivity and working hours. Our methodology is general and could be 
applied to any country experiencing sufficient variation in thermal inversions.  
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Second, we provide general-equilibrium estimates of pollution’s effect on output 
including effects on both productivity and labor supply. Previous papers avoided this 
complication because they considered only small sets of workers or firms so that it was 
unnecessary to consider the feedback effect of output on pollution. This also 
distinguishes our work from Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018) which examines only partial-
equilibrium effects. We do so by simulating these effects in a dynamic-general 
equilibrium model of China’s economy. Calibrating the model to observed economic 
values incorporating the causal effect of output on pollution, we find that pollution’s 
general-equilibrium effects are greater than its partial-equilibrium effects. These 
estimates can be used to evaluate environmental policies that reduce manufacturing 
output or reduce pollution through improved abatement technologies. We believe ours 
is the first paper to provide general-equilibrium estimates relating productivity and air 
pollution. The simulation approach is general and can be applied in any setting in 
which partial-equilibrium estimates of pollution’s effect on output and output’s effect 
on pollution are available. 
Third, there is relatively little evidence concerning pollution’s effect on high-skilled 
workers (exceptions are Archsmith et al. (2018) on umpires, Heyes et al. (2016a) on 
investors, Heyes et al. (2016b) on politicians, and Kahn and Li (2019) on judges). We 
estimate the effects of PM2.5 on productivity separately for firms in high- and low-
technology industries based on the OECD (2011) classification and find significant 
effects for both. This suggests that the results apply not just to older, traditional 
manufacturing firms but also to those employing newer, more advanced technologies. 
Estimates for China are important in and of themselves. China is the world’s most 
populous country and a large source of manufacturing and the resultant pollution. 
China represented 22% of the world’s manufacturing output in 2012.3 The findings also 
have implications for the global economy as China incurs a disproportionate fraction of 
the world’s pollution because of its substantial exports. Depending on the type of 
pollutant, 17 to 36% of China’s air pollution is attributable to exports (Lin et al., 2014). 
Our estimates imply that policies that reduce China’s air pollution can generate 
substantial increases in productivity in addition to health benefits and, given China’s 
extensive exports, benefit other countries via trade. Our estimates complement the 
literature that estimates the social costs of reduced health due to China’s air pollution 
(Matus et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Ebenstein et al., 2015; Bombardini and Li, 2016; 
Ebenstein et al., 2016; He et al., 2016; Ito and Zhang, 2016). 
Many developing countries are hesitant to implement measures to reduce air pollution 
for fear of hindering growth (Hanna and Oliva, 2015). Figure 1 illustrates the 
                                                          
3 “China has a Dominant Share of World Manufacturing,” United Nations and MAPI, January 6, 2014 
(https://www.mapi.net/blog/2014/01/china-has-dominant-share-world-manufacturing). 
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environmental pollution resulting from China’s development. It plots the average 
concentration of PM2.5 across all regions of China over the sample period against annual 
value added for all firms in our sample. The rapid increase in output has resulted in 
accompanying rapid increases in air pollution, especially after China joins the WTO in 
2001. Our finding of significant productivity gains from reducing pollution provides 
additional impetus to implement pollution control measures. Because of China’s severe 
pollution, the central government has designed many policies to reduce air pollution 
but these have often gone unenforced or under-enforced because local governments 
lack incentives to do so or their incentives emphasize alternative goals such as economic 
growth (Li and Zhou, 2005; Chen et al., 2016; Jia, 2017). Our findings suggest local 
governments may underestimate the benefits to local economic growth of reducing air 
pollution. 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related 
literature. Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 specifies the econometric models and 
discusses identification issues and strategies. Section 5 presents our partial-equilibrium 
results and Section 6 the general-equilibrium analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Pollution and productivity 
How does air pollution affect short-run productivity? An extensive literature 
documents the negative effects that a high concentration of air pollution can have on 
human health. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), short-run 
exposure can lead to decreased lung function, irregular heartbeat, increased respiratory 
problems, nonfatal heart attacks, and angina.4 These short-run effects can result in 
decreased physical stamina at work and missed work days. Long-run exposure may 
lead to cardiopulmonary diseases, respiratory infections, lung cancer (EPA, 2004), and 
asthma (Neidell, 2004). These long-run health problems can manifest themselves in the 
short run if high levels of pollution trigger conditions resulting from previously 
accumulated exposure. Infant and elderly morbidity resulting from air pollution (Chay 
and Greenstone, 2003; Deryugina et al., 2016) can require working adults to miss work 
to care for them (Hanna and Oliva, 2015; Aragόn et al., 2017). Long-term exposure can 
also reduce life expectancy (Chen et al., 2013; Ebenstein et al., 2017) which can result in 
experienced workers being replaced by new, inexperienced ones. 
Air pollution can also lower cognitive ability, alter emotions, increase anxiety, and have 
other negative psychological effects (Levinson, 2012; Lavy et al., 2014; Pun et al., 2017; 
                                                          
4 See the EPA websites: https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution; https://www.epa.gov/so2-pollution; and 
https://www.epa.gov/co-pollution. 
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Chen et al., 2018) which would affect the performance of both physical and knowledge 
workers. All of these effects can be compounded by spillovers to other workers (Arnott 
et al., 2005, Chapter 4). Moreover, PM2.5 can seep into buildings (Thatcher and Layton, 
1995; Vette et al., 2001), making avoidance behavior costly or impossible for workers 
unless their employer provides proper filtration equipment. While our estimates are 
unable to distinguish between these various channels they capture all of them. 
Pollution can affect output through productivity, the intensive margin, and labor 
supply, the extensive margin (pollution can also affect capital supply but we ignore this 
here since we do not find significant effects in our estimates). The intensive and 
extensive margins depend on the context and the time unit measured. In our context, 
time is measured in worker-years. Therefore, our productivity estimates capture all 
possible channels that affect per-hour productivity (intensive margin) and hours 
worked (one type of extensive margin) although we cannot distinguish them. We 
separately estimate the labor supply effects on number of worker-years (another type of 
extensive margin). Pollution could also affect capital productivity through firms 
investing in pollution-reduction measures, either in response to regulation or to offset 
decreases in productivity that arise from pollution. For example, abatement equipment 
that consumes some output. 
To illustrate this, consider a constant-returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production 
function in capital (𝐾𝐾) and labor (𝐿𝐿): 𝑄𝑄 = (𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾)𝛾𝛾(𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)1−𝛾𝛾, (1) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 is capital productivity and 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 is labor productivity. Logging both sides: 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝑄𝑄) = [𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾) + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿)] + 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝐾𝐾) + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝐿𝐿). (2) 
The first term in brackets on the right-hand side is also total factor productivity: 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 = [𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾) + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿)]. The effects of pollution (Ω) are given by (ignoring 
effects on capital supply as noted above): 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑄𝑄)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(Ω) = �𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾)dln(Ω) + (1 − 𝛾𝛾) 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿)dln(Ω) � + (1 − 𝛾𝛾) 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝐿𝐿)dln(Ω). (3) 
There are two potential effects: the effect on productivity (the first term in brackets on 
the right-hand side) and the effect on labor supply. We estimate these two separately. 
For productivity, we use two different approaches following Syverson (2011): the effect 
on output per worker and the effect on TFP. 
We can use this setup to relate our results to the previous literature. In our setting 𝐿𝐿 is 
measured in worker-years and 𝑄𝑄 annually. Suppose per-hour labor productivity is 𝑏𝑏 
and each worker’s annual hours is 𝐻𝐻 then 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 = 𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝐻𝐻. In the data we observe 𝐿𝐿 but not 𝑏𝑏 
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or 𝐻𝐻. Our productivity estimates (both TFP and output per worker) hold the number of 
worker-years constant so that: 𝑑𝑑(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(Ω) = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑄𝑄 𝐿𝐿⁄ )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(Ω) �𝐿𝐿 = 𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾)dln(Ω) + (1 − 𝛾𝛾) �𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑎𝑎)dln(Ω) ∗ 𝐻𝐻 + 𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝐻𝐻)dln(Ω)�. (4) 
Our estimates therefore capture both the intensive (per-hour productivity) and one type 
of extensive margin (hours worked) effects on productivity. We also separately estimate 
the effect on labor supply (𝐿𝐿) (another extensive margin) to determine the effects on 
total output given by Equation (3). 
Extant studies of pollution and productivity observe worker hours (𝐻𝐻) and therefore 
measure effects on per-hour productivity (𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝑏𝑏) dln(Ω)⁄ ); many also separately 
estimate effects on hours worked (𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝐻𝐻) dln(Ω)⁄ ) but find little effect. PM2.5 reduces 
per-hour productivity of pear-packing workers in California but has little effect on labor 
supply as measured by hours worked or absenteeism (Chang et al., 2016). PM2.5 also 
reduces per-hour productivity of garment factory workers in India with no effect on 
absences (Adhvaryu et al., 2014). PM2.5 and SO2 reduce per-hour output of textile 
workers at two sites in China but has little effect on hours worked (He et al., 2019). 
Ozone reduces per-hour productivity of outdoor fruit pickers in California but not 
hours worked or absenteeism (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2012) and pollution measured 
by the air pollution index (API) affects call center workers (Chang et al., 2019) with no 
effect on hours worked. 
To provide precise measures of daily output, all of these previous studies focus on a 
small group of firms or a particular type of worker. Although this helps establish a 
causal link because pollution is exogenous to the activities of a small number of firms, 
the results may not generalize. A few other papers examine pollution’s effect on 
performance in other environments. Air pollution increases students’ absences (Currie 
et al., 2009) and their cognitive performances and test scores (Ebenstein et al., 2016). It 
also has negative effects on short-run performance of outdoor athletic participants 
including soccer players (Lichter et al., 2017) and marathon runners (Guo and Fu, 2019). 
 
3. Primary data 
We estimate firm-level productivity combining comprehensive data on firm 
characteristics with air pollution data for highly-specific geographic areas across all of 
China from 1998 to 2007. While several different pollutants’ effects on productivity have 
been studied we focus on PM2.5 because of its severe effects. Due to its small size it can 
enter the lungs and bloodstream causing severe health problems and reduced stamina. 
Our pollution measure is monthly concentration of PM2.5 derived from satellite-based 
Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) retrieval techniques maintained by the National 
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Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).5 We use the AOD data because it 
provides the most comprehensive measure of air pollution across China’s geography 
and over time. AOD measures the extinction of the solar beam by dust and haze and 
can be used to predict pollution even in areas lacking ground-based monitoring stations 
(Gupta et al., 2006; van Donkelaar et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2011). Chen et al. (2017) 
validate the AOD data using ground-based, station data in China, and find that the 
difference between them is statistically insignificant conditional on geographic and year 
fixed effects. The PM2.5 concentrations are calculated following Buchard et al. (2016). 
The AOD data have several advantages compared to ground-based pollution data. First, 
it predates the beginning of our firm sample in 1998 while ground-based pollution data 
are available beginning only in 2000 giving us two more years of data. Second, it covers 
the whole country while ground-based pollution data cover only 42 cities in 2000 
increasing to 113 in 2010. Third, ground-based pollution data are potentially subject to 
human manipulation (Andrews, 2008; Ghanem and Zhang, 2014) while the satellite data 
are not. The AOD pollution data are reported in grids of 50 by 60 kilometers which we 
aggregate to the county level – the smallest administrative unit in China to which we 
can match firm locations.6 We then average by year to obtain annual mean 
concentrations of PM2.5 in each county-year. 
Although the AOD data is remarkably accurate in measuring ground-level PM2.5 our 
paper faces a problem present in much of the literature: different pollutants are highly 
correlated which may prevent us from isolating a single pollutant’s effects. We are 
potentially aided by the fact that we instrument using thermal inversions and not all 
pollutants are affected by them. Nonetheless, thermal inversions do affect other 
pollutants (e.g., carbon monoxide as described by Arceo et al. (2016)) and inversions 
may therefore not be specifically correlated with PM2.5 vis-à-vis other pollutants. 
Therefore, our estimates can be interpreted as air pollution impacts more broadly not 
necessarily specifically from PM2.5. 
                                                          
5 The AOD data are obtained from the Modern-Era Retrospective Analysis for Research and Applications 
version 2 (MERRA-2) and are available at 
https://disc.gsfc.nasa.gov/datasets/M2TMNXAER_V5.12.4/summary?keywords=Aerosols#. We utilize 
M2TMNXAER version 5.12.4 which reports monthly AOD data within each 0.5 degrees latitude by 0.625 
degrees longitude (corresponding to 50 by 60 kilometers) grid. 
6 The six-digit administrative code is published by the NBS’ Administrative Division: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjbz/xzqhdm/201401/t20140116_501070.html (in Chinese). In constructing 
the pollution and thermal inversion measures based on the satellite data, we take spatially-weighted 
averages across a county of all pixels based on the proportion of the county that each pixel represents. 
Specifically, we interpolate within the original 50 by 60 kilometer grids using the bilinear method 
(Hijmans et al., 2015) to obtain 10 by 12 kilometer grids to better accommodate counties that are smaller 
than 50 by 60 kilometers. For counties that span more than one 10 by 12 kilometer grid we use a 
weighted-average (by area) across all grids that it spans. 
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Since the satellite pollution measure covers the entire country we can include all 
manufacturing firms for which we have data. Our firm-level output and characteristics 
data is from annual surveys of manufacturing firms conducted by China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The survey includes all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
regardless of size and all non-SOEs whose annual sales exceed CNY 5 million (USD 0.8 
million) and contains detailed information on firm location,7 accounting measures, and 
firm characteristics. This captures 90.7% of China’s total manufacturing output in the 
later years (Brandt et al., 2012). During our sample period this includes 2,082,823 firm-
year observations and 544,308 unique firms across all years. 
Following the matching algorithm described in Brandt et al. (2012) we match firms over 
time to form an unbalanced panel.8 This matching process is careful and avoids 
interpreting name changes as different firms (Brand et al. (2012), Section A.2 of their 
online appendix). The panel is very unbalanced due to China’s rapid growth during this 
period which leads to a large number of new firms surpassing the CNY 5 million 
revenue threshold year-by-year.9 We also follow Brandt et al. (2012) in converting 
nominal into real values using industry-level price indices. We drop observations with 
missing or unreliable data following the previous literature (Cai and Liu, 2009; Brandt et 
al., 2012; Yu, 2014).10 These represent 10.3% of observations and 7.9% of total 
manufacturing output. The biggest loss of data in estimation is due to firms appearing 
in only one year and dropped with the inclusion of firm fixed effects. These represent 
16.1% of observations and 30.5% of total manufacturing output.11 
Finally, we winsorize the top and bottom 0.5% of data based on each of the values of 
output, value added, employment, and capital to be consistent with the previous 
literature (Cai and Liu, 2009) and because of the risk that these involve data entry or 
reporting errors. However, we show that the results are similar using the non-
                                                          
7 Firm location is known at least up to the six-digit administrative code level used to match to the 
pollution data. Specific addresses are known only for a small share of firms and thus using these to match 
would make our data far less comprehensive. 
8 Their Stata programs are posted at: http://feb.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix. 
9 Brandt et al. (2012) confirm that these appearances are de novo and not due to firm restructuring. The 
annual rate of exit is less than 14% (Section A.2 of their online appendix). 
10 We drop observations with missing or negative values for output, value added, employment, or capital; 
firms with fewer than eight employees since they may not have reliable accounting systems; and firms 
violating accounting identities such as the components of net assets exceeding total assets or current 
depreciation exceeding cumulative depreciation. 
11 Because of China’s rapid growth during this time, 43% of these single-year firms occur in the last year 
of the sample. For the remaining 57% that occur in earlier years, 8% are SOEs and therefore must be due 
to actual entry and exit. The remaining 92% are non-SOEs so we do not know whether they appear in 
only a single year because they enter and then exit or they move above and then below the CNY 5 million 
threshold to appear in the sample. However, as Online Appendix 1 shows, the characteristics of these 
firms are similar to the full sample except that they are smaller. Given the large number of single-year 
firms, we comment more below on the potential effects of censoring due to the CNY 5 million threshold. 
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winsorized data. We also show that the results are robust to excluding the few multi-
plant firms in the data which cannot be uniquely matched to a single location. The final 
data include 1,593,247 firm-year observations for 356,179 unique firms. Geographically, 
the sample includes 2,755 counties with an average of 58 firms per county-year. 
One issue with obtaining broad-based measures of productivity is how to measure it. 
Previous papers in the literature focused on one or a small set of firms producing a 
single well-defined product where output quantity is directly measurable. Pooling all 
manufacturing firms, as we do, requires an alternative measure. Since we abstract from 
intermediate inputs we use value added as the measure of output. Value added is 
reported directly in the data and equals total production (including both sales and 
inventory) of all goods produced in the year valued at their market prices less the cost 
of all intermediate inputs employed in producing them. Value added per worker is 
commonly used as a measure of productivity in the general-productivity literature 
(Syverson, 2011; Brandt et al., 2012) and in the temperature-productivity literature 
(Hsiang, 2010; Dell et al., 2012). However, it raises two issues. 
First, using value added requires that prices do not reflect market power in either the 
primary or downstream input markets. If they do not, monetary-based measures are 
preferred over quantity-based measures as they reflect quality differences (Syverson, 
2011). As with other studies that use data sets with many firms, we cannot guarantee 
that prices are independent of market power; however, thermal inversions are 
independent of firm-level market power allowing us to consistently estimate pollution’s 
effect on productivity via instrumented pollution. The second issue concerns multi-
product firms. Their mix of products is not discernible from the firm’s value added and 
may be correlated with pollution levels. However, our instrumenting strategy addresses 
this issue: thermal inversions are uncorrelated with a firm’s decision of product mix 
thereby removing any bias in the instrumented results. 
We obtain daily, station-level weather variables that could affect both air pollution and 
productivity including temperature, precipitation, relative humidity, wind speed, 
sunshine duration, and barometric pressure from the National Meteorological 
Information Center of China. We convert the daily station data to daily-county level 
using the inverse-distance weighting method (Deschênes and Greenstone, 2011) to give 
less weight to stations more distant from the geographic centroid. To allow for extreme 
weather events to have differential effects from more normal ones, we follow Deschênes 
et al. (2017) and calculate twenty quantiles for each weather variable based on the daily 
distribution and include the annual number of days within each quantile. The weather 
measures are then matched to the firm data by county-year. 
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For our instrument, we obtain thermal inversion data from NASA.12 The data report air 
temperatures every six hours at 42 vertical layers from 110 meters to 36 thousand 
meters within 50- by 60-kilometer grids. We aggregate from the grid to the county level 
within each six-hour period and for each layer. Following Arceo et al. (2016), we define 
a thermal inversion as the temperature of the second layer (320 meters) being higher 
than that of the first layer (110 meters). We determine this within each six-hour period 
of each day for each county. Since thermal inversions are short-lived (on the order of a 
few weeks) relative to the annual output measure, we use a cumulate annual measure 
of inversions to make them temporally consistent. For our instrument, we calculate for 
each county the annual number of days that have at least one inversion. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the key variables. The firm characteristics are at 
the firm-year level and reflect a high degree of variation in productivity. The pollution 
and thermal inversion data are at the county-year level. The pollution levels are such 
that they are likely to have an effect on mental and physical health and therefore 
productivity. The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends a maximum annual 
mean of ten 𝜇𝜇g/m3 for PM2.5 and a maximum mean of twenty 𝜇𝜇g/m3 within a 24-hour 
period (WHO, 2006). In the sample, the mean annual PM2.5 level is 53.5 with a high of 
134.8. The annual number of days with thermal inversions displays significant variation 
ranging from zero to 333 days per year with a mean equal to a little under one-half year. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
 
4. Model specification and identification 
Our primary econometric model is: 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Ω𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (5) 
where 𝑖𝑖 indicates firm and 𝑡𝑡 year. Ω measures pollution and 𝑊𝑊 contains the vector of 
weather variables faced by firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡. We aggregate the annual pollution and 
weather measures to the county level because the location of most firms is known only 
at the county level and not finer. Because of this, we also check the robustness to 
clustering the standard errors at the county-year level. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 captures the 
effect of pollution on productivity. 
Firm fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) capture time-persistent firm attributes that affect productivity. 
Since very few firms switch counties (7%) over the time period of our sample, these also 
absorb most county-specific time-invariant factors that affect productivity. Similarly, no 
                                                          
12 Specifically, we use product M2I6NPANA version 5.12.4 from MERRA-2 available at 
https://disc.sci.gsfc.nasa.gov/datasets/M2I6NPANA_V5.12.4/summary?keywords=%22MERRA-
2%22%20M2I6NPANA&start=1920-01-01&end=2017-01-16.  
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firms switch industries so that all time-invariant, industry-specific unobservables 
affecting productivity are absorbed by the firm fixed effects. Year fixed effects (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖) 
capture annual national shocks to firm output such as business cycle or macroeconomic 
effects. The error term (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) captures time-varying, firm-specific unobservables that 
affect productivity. In our baseline estimation we cluster standard errors by firm to 
allow for serial correlation in productivity within firm over time but we show 
robustness to various other clustering patterns. 
We use two different measures for productivity: output per worker 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ ) where 𝑌𝑌 
is value added and 𝐿𝐿 is number of workers and total factor productivity 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for firm 𝑖𝑖 
in year 𝑡𝑡.13 In estimating TFP, we instrument for firms’ endogenous choices of inputs 
using two different approaches: investment as an instrument (Olley and Pakes, 1996) 
and intermediate inputs as an instrument (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Table 1 
provides the summary statistics for TFP estimated under both approaches. The 
correlation between TFP (using the OP method) and output per worker is 0.71 
significant at better than the 0.01% level. We use output per worker for our primary 
results to be consistent with the environmental economics literature but the results are 
robust, although with somewhat smaller effects, using TFP. For TFP, we use a two-step 
approach as in Wang and Wang (2015), Yu (2015), and Brandt et al. (2017). In the first 
step we estimate TFP and in the second step relate TFP to pollution including controls. 
Identification requires that, conditional on the control variables, pollution is 
independent of the error in Equation (5). The causal identification issues that are 
specific to our context include simultaneity bias, omitted variable bias, and spatial 
sorting. 
4.1 Causal identification issue – simultaneity and omitted variable biases 
Simultaneity bias can lead OLS estimates of pollution’s effect on productivity to be 
biased either upward or downward. Absent any effect of pollution on productivity, 
higher productivity in a county leads to both more output and more pollution, biasing 
OLS estimates upward toward or above zero. On the other hand, if pollution decreases 
productivity this will lower output and therefore pollution biasing OLS estimates 
downward away from zero. If pollution lowers productivity, firms may also 
compensate by using more of alternative inputs. If these inputs are high-polluting (for 
example dirty energy) this would bias OLS estimates downward while compensation to 
clean inputs would bias them upward. 
                                                          
13 Estimating output per worker has been criticized because it depends on the level of capital employed 
(Syverson, 2011). This is not a problem in our setting because our instrumented pollution measure is 
orthogonal to inputs. 
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Omitted-variable bias due to local, time-varying conditions could also lead to either an 
over- or under-statement of pollution’s effect on productivity in OLS estimates (since 
we include firm fixed effects time-invariant conditions will not create bias). For example, 
counties with more productive firms may implement more advanced, lower-polluting 
technology over time leading to an upward bias. Alternatively, firms that have older, 
higher-polluting technology may have low productivity and insufficient funds to 
upgrade their production technology over time leading to a downward bias as 
technology degrades. Local trends in regulatory conditions may also bias OLS estimates. 
For example, counties with high-productivity workers may press for implementation of 
more stringent environmental regulations over time leading to a downward bias. On 
the other hand, an upward bias could result if counties with older, less productive and 
higher polluting technology face environmental “crises” and initiate more stringent 
regulations. Similarly, industrial policies might be used to stimulate production in less-
polluted counties over time introducing upward bias. We address these identification 
issues using instrumental variables. 
A valid instrument is correlated with a county’s air pollution but uncorrelated with its 
resident firms’ productivity except via pollution. Our instrument is the annual number 
of days with at least one thermal inversion for each county. Normally, air temperature 
decreases with altitude above the Earth’s surface. A thermal (or temperature) inversion 
is a deviation from this. It occurs when a mass of warmer, less dense air moves above a 
cooler, denser air mass trapping dust and pollutants near the ground and increasing air 
pollution. Since thermal inversions are a meteorological phenomenon and, after 
conditioning on weather variables, are unrelated with production except via pollution, 
it is a valid instrument. A few studies have applied this identification strategy to 
estimate the effects of air pollution on various outcomes (Arceo et al., 2016; Hicks et al., 
2016; Jans et al., 2018; Sager, 2019; Chen et al., 2017; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2018). A caveat 
to this approach is that inversions can affect the efficacy of pesticides and fertilizer in 
agriculture. Although our firm data does not include agriculture there could be knock-
on effects upstream or downstream in manufacturing that could affect the instrument’s 
exogeneity. 
With this as our instrument we employ two-stage least squares (2SLS) with the first-
stage equation: Ω𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (6) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of thermal inversion days in firm 𝑖𝑖’s county in year 𝑡𝑡. The 
weather controls from the second stage are included because these same variables affect 
the formation of inversions (Arceo et al., 2016) and are also needed to ensure the 
exclusion restriction is met in the second stage. 
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4.2 Causal identification issue – spatial sorting 
Spatial sorting results from either firms or workers self-selecting into particular counties 
based on their pollution levels. Firms may choose to locate in counties with less severe 
pollution because it leads to higher productivity which would bias estimates of 
pollution’s effect on productivity upward toward or above zero. Alternatively, firms 
may choose to locate in counties with more severe pollution because it reflects less 
stringent underlying local environmental regulations and therefore lower costs – the 
“pollution haven” effect (Becker and Henderson, 2000; Greenstone, 2002; Brunnermeier 
and Levinson, 2004). In this case, the direction of the bias induced depends on whether 
firms with higher pollution output are more or less productive. If they are more 
productive, estimates will be biased upward toward or above zero and if less 
productive downward away from zero. 
The firm fixed effects included in estimation absorb any initial endogenous sorting of 
firms across counties so that only sorting that occurs during the sample period will 
introduce bias.14 Only 7% of firms relocate counties during the sample period. 
Excluding these from estimation suggests some sorting effects and larger productivity 
effects absent sorting. Firm entry and exit during the sample period could introduce 
bias through endogenous selection. To check for this possibility we estimate the effect of 
pollution on the fraction of firms exiting and entering each county in each year 
(controlling for endogeneity) and find no significant effect for either. 
A second possible type of spatial sorting is workers choosing their location based on 
their willingness to pay for air quality. High-skilled workers generally have a higher 
willingness-to-pay for better air quality and are more productive than low-skilled 
workers. This would result in dirty cities having a high proportion of low-skilled 
workers and low firm productivity and clean cities having a high proportion of high-
skilled workers and high firm productivity (Lin, 2017) exacerbating pollution’s negative 
effect on firm productivity. 
Inclusion of firm fixed effects means that any initial endogenous sorting of workers will 
be absorbed in them and only movement of workers during the sample period will 
create bias. This effect is not likely large since we estimate annual effects and such 
migration would likely occur over longer periods,15 but we check for evidence of this 
occurring. Based on OECD (2011) we categorize each firm as high, medium-high, 
medium-low, and low technology and, based on their employment, compute the 
fraction of workers in each of the four categories in each county-year. Changes in 
                                                          
14 Sorting could also occur by industry but since no firms switch industries this is absorbed by the firm 
fixed effects. 
15 For example, Chen et al. (2017) find that people migrate in response to air pollution over a five-year 
period.  
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pollution (controlling for endogeneity) is not predictive of changes in these fractions 
over time except for a small, positive effect on the low-technology fraction. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline results 
We first present estimates not accounting for any endogeneity bias between 
productivity and pollution. Table 2 presents OLS estimates of Equation (5) using output 
per worker. Without weather controls (Column (1)), PM2.5 pollution has no effect on 
productivity. Including weather controls (Column (2)), reveals a positive effect of 
pollution on productivity. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
Because of the simultaneity and omitted-variable biases, OLS produces inconsistent 
estimates. We use the annual number of days with a thermal inversion as an instrument 
for pollution concentration. We first check whether thermal inversions are predictive of 
productivity in a reduced-form estimate. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 show the 
results without and with weather controls. Both specifications yield statistically 
significant results and the coefficient with weather controls implies that one additional 
day with an inversion annually decreases productivity by 0.03%. 
Columns (5) and (6) in the top panel of Table 2 show that the instrument is a powerful 
predictor of PM2.5 concentrations. The coefficient on annual days with thermal 
inversions is positive and highly significant both with and without weather controls 
and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic (KP) (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) for weak 
identification is much larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value of 16.38.16 One 
additional day with an inversion increases PM2.5 by 0.036 𝜇𝜇g/m3 controlling for weather. 
These are big effects. Using the results with weather controls, a one standard deviation 
increase in the annual number of days with inversions increases PM2.5 by 2.8 𝜇𝜇g/m3 
(5.3%). 
The lower panel of Columns (5) and (6) show the second-stage results. Consistent with 
the instrument correcting for endogeneity, the coefficient moves to being significantly 
negative. Without weather controls, instrumented PM2.5 has a negative and very 
significant effect on output per worker. A one 𝜇𝜇g/m3 increase in PM2.5 decreases 
productivity by 0.80%. Evaluating this at the mean PM2.5 in the sample (53.5) yields an 
elasticity of -0.43. Controlling for weather changes increases the estimate slightly and 
                                                          
16 Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values apply when model errors are independent and identically 
distributed. No critical values are available for the case when the model allows for standard errors that 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering. 
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makes it even more significant. A one 𝜇𝜇g/m3 increase in PM2.5 decreases productivity 
by 0.82% implying an elasticity of -0.44. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2018) find a lower 
elasticity (-0.11) for European regions which could be due either to lower levels of 
pollution in Europe or due to their data including both manufacturing and services. 
Using TFP as our productivity measure yields slightly lower estimates: an elasticity of   
-0.26 using the OP estimator and -0.19 using the LP estimator (Columns (7) and (8)). 
Throughout the rest of the paper we focus on results using output per worker since 
previous papers estimating pollution’s effect have used this measure. However, the 
results are robust to, but somewhat lower, using TFP. Also, since controlling for 
weather is preferred we do so throughout the remainder of the paper. 
How large are these effects? Consider lowering PM2.5 by one percent nationwide 
through means other than lowering manufacturing output. This could include reducing 
other pollution sources like road dust, automobile exhaust, and power generation or by 
decreasing pollution per unit of manufacturing output via pollution abatement 
equipment that does not reduce output. The resulting productivity improvement would 
increase the average firm’s value added by CNY 56.3 (USD 7.4) thousand annually and 
increase total value added across all firms by CNY 9.0 (USD 1.2) billion annually.17 This 
represents 0.060% of China’s GDP.18 
Online Appendix 2 compares estimates for counties in China’s three major economic 
centers (Jing-Jin-Ji, Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River Delta)19 to the rest of the 
country. The estimates for the two are fairly close to each other and significant implying 
that air pollution has an effect on productivity even outside the major manufacturing 
centers. 
Since our estimates capture pollution’s effect on both per-hour productivity and 
working hours, it is useful to disentangle the two for comparisons to previous estimates 
of per-hour productivity effects.20 We borrow estimates from Aragón et al. (2017) which 
finds an elasticity of working hours with respect to PM2.5 of -0.21 in Lima, Peru. 
Assuming PM2.5’s effect on working hours is the same in China, our estimated elasticity 
of per-hour productivity with respect to pollution is -0.23. It is also similar to the upper 
end of estimates by He et al. (2019) for textile workers in two firms in two Chinese 
                                                          
17 A 1% decrease in PM2.5 increases annual output by 0.44%. The mean annual output per firm in the 
sample is CNY 12.82 million implying an annual increase of CNY 56.3 thousand. There is an average of 
159,325 firms present in each year of the sample implying an annual increase in output across all firms of 
CNY 9.0 billion annually. 
18 China’s average annual real GDP over the ten-year sample period is CNY 14.85 trillion. 
19 The Jing-Jin-Ji region includes Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei; the Yangtze River Delta region includes 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui; and the Pearl River Delta region includes Guangdong. 
20 This makes use of the fact that the elasticity of productivity equals the elasticity of productivity per 
hour plus the elasticity of hours worked as shown in Equation (3). 
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provinces. They find elasticities ranging from -0.035 to -0.30 from PM2.5 exposure if 
effects are accumulated over 25 to 30 days. 
Our estimate exceeds that in Adhvaryu et al. (2014), which finds an elasticity of -0.052 
for per-hour productivity with respect to PM2.5 for garment factory workers in India. It 
is also larger than the elasticity of -0.062 for PM2.5 found in Chang et al. (2016) for indoor 
pear packers in California and the estimate in Chang et al. (2019) which finds an 
elasticity of per-hour labor productivity with respect to the API of -0.023 although the 
latter is for services workers. The fact that we estimate elasticities that are at least as 
great as or greater than previous papers could be due to two factors. First, previous 
estimates apply only to particular worker types or small sets of firms. Second, previous 
studies measure daily or monthly effects while we capture annual cumulative effects. 
We can also compare our estimates to studies that estimate the effect of PM2.5 on 
economic outcomes other than productivity. To do so, we normalize results to the 
monetary impact of a one-percent decrease in PM2.5, which in our case increases 
productivity by USD 1.2 billion annually. Deryugina et al. (2016) estimate the short-run 
effect of PM2.5 on mortality in the U.S. They find that a one-percent decrease in PM2.5 
concentration (0.11 𝜇𝜇g/m3) leads to a gain of USD 0.45 billion annually in avoided 
mortality – about one-third of our estimate. Bishop et al. (2017) estimate the long-run 
effect of PM2.5 on dementia in the U.S. They find that a one-percent decrease in PM2.5 
concentration (0.09 𝜇𝜇g/m3) reduces medical expenditure on dementia by USD 0.11 
billion annually which is about one-tenth of our estimate for productivity. Chen et al. 
(2018) estimate the short-run effect of PM2.5 on mental illness in China. They find that a 
one-percent decrease in PM2.5 concentration (0.48 𝜇𝜇g/m3) reduces expenditure on 
mental illness treatment by USD 0.60 billion annually – about one-half of our estimate 
for productivity. 
5.2 Robustness checks 
Online Appendix 3 shows robustness to different assumptions about the model 
compared to the baseline results replicated in Column (1). Since some of our 
explanatory variables are grouped at the county-year level and there may be time-
invariant unobserved factors affecting productivity at the county level, the standard 
errors may be biased downward (Kloek, 1981; Moulton, 1986). We check this in several 
different ways. Column (2) allows for two-way clustering of errors by firm and county-
by-year (Cameron et al., 2011). This allows for serial correlation in productivity within 
firms as well as spatial correlation within each county-year. Although some significance 
is lost, the results remain significant. Since there is no standard way to cluster with 
multi-way clustering (Cameron and Miller, 2015) we try two other methods. Column (3) 
clusters the standard errors by county-year, which allows unobservables to be spatially 
correlated within each county-year. The standard errors are similar to those under two-
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way clustering. Clustering at the county level, which allows for spatial and serial 
correlation within county, in Column (4), increases standard errors only slightly and the 
results remain significant at better than the 5% level. 
Our baseline results use year fixed effects to control for time trends. We test for 
robustness to regional trends in four different ways: year-by-region fixed effects21 in 
Column (5); year-by-province fixed effects in Column (6); province-specific quadratic 
time trends in Column (7); and year fixed effects along with province-specific quadratic 
time trends in Column (8). All four yield very significant results and all yield point 
estimates that are larger than our baseline estimates except for province-specific 
quadratic time trends. We continue to use year fixed effects as the baseline model 
because the province-specific time trends impose a specific functional form. The year-
by-province fixed effects allow more flexibility but we prefer the more conservative 
estimates using year fixed effects. 
Our baseline estimates weight all observations equally. Column (2) of Online Appendix 
4 re-estimates weighting observations by value added per firm. The coefficient yields a 
slightly higher elasticity (-0.47) than the baseline estimates shown in Column (1). 
Column (3) shows that not winsorizing the data leads to very similar results as the 
baseline estimates (an elasticity of -0.47 evaluated at the mean PM2.5 of 53.3). Column (4) 
uses the raw data (before eliminating the unreliable observations as described in 
footnote 10 and without winsorizing) which yields a somewhat greater elasticity (-0.58) 
using mean PM2.5 of 53.3. The survey is at the firm level and therefore it is possible that 
a firm has multiple plants in different locations leading to an incorrect match with the 
pollution data. However, more than 95% of the firms in the survey are single-plant 
(Brandt et al., 2012). Column (5) eliminates the few multi-plant firms from the sample. 
The estimated elasticity if very similar to the baseline (-0.47) based on mean PM2.5 of 
53.9. Finally, Column (6) uses log rather than linear pollution. The elasticity (-0.52) is 
very close to that estimated using a linear function. 
As a test of whether it is inversions that are causing the shifts in pollution and therefore 
productivity we run a placebo test in which we randomly reassign the pollution to the 
inversion and weather data across years. We repeat this one hundred times and re-
estimate the model. Online Appendix 5 shows the estimates along with 95% confidence 
intervals compared to the baseline estimate. Only four of the one hundred estimates are 
significantly different than zero and all four barely so. 
5.3 Tests for firm sorting 
Firms may relocate to places with better air quality to improve productivity or to places 
with lax environmental regulation to lower costs. Table 3 shows tests for this potential 
                                                          
21 We divide China into eight regions following Zhang et al. (2018).  
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spatial sorting. Column (2) estimates excluding firms that relocated across counties 
(about 7% of firms) during the sample period. The estimated elasticity (-0.67) based on a 
mean PM2.5 of 53.7 is larger than that of the baseline estimate (-0.44) using all firms 
(replicated in Column (1)) consistent with either firms avoiding pollution to increase 
their productivity or a “pollution haven” effect and high-polluting firms being more 
productive. This also means that our baseline estimates may understate pollution’s 
effect on productivity to the extent that the non-relocating firms are representative of 
the full sample. 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
Although the inclusion of firm fixed effects in our main results controls for any initial 
sorting of firms based on pollution levels, new firms that enter during the sample 
period may choose locations endogenously based on pollution. To see if this might 
affect the results, Column (3) of Table 3 tests whether a county’s instrumented pollution 
significantly affects the fraction of new firms entering the county in the following year. 
We aggregate to the county-level for this analysis because we do not observe firms prior 
to entry and therefore cannot create an entry variable at the firm level. In addition to the 
weather controls we include county and year fixed effects so that identification derives 
from within-county variation over time. We cluster standard errors at the county level 
to allow spatial correlation in unobserved factors within counties and intertemporal 
variation across years within counties. Year 1998 data is dropped because it is the first 
year of our sample period and thus we cannot determine the level of entry. The 
estimated effect of entry is close to zero and insignificant consistent with pollution not 
affecting firm location choice on entry. 
If pollution’s effect on productivity is strong enough firms may exit the market. 
Estimates using the full sample are conditional on survival, potentially understating the 
productivity effect. To see if this might be a major factor, Column (4) of Table 3 tests 
whether a county’s instrumented pollution significantly affects the fraction of firms 
exiting the county in the following year. This county-level regression is analogous to the 
entry regression and includes the same control variables and uses the same clustering of 
standard errors. Year 2007 data is dropped in this estimation since we cannot observe 
whether firms present in 2007 exit in 2008. The estimate is close to zero and insignificant 
suggesting that exit bias is not a major concern.22 This also suggests that any actions 
taken by the government induced by thermal inversions to shut down firms in high-
polluting areas are minimal. 
                                                          
22 Estimates using a balanced panel could address this issue as well as any selection effects by entering 
firms. However, only 7% of firms are present in all years due to China’s rapid growth as discussed in 
Section 3. For this small sample, the estimates are very significant and the estimated elasticities are much 
greater presumably due to pollution exposure levels that differ from those in the full sample. 
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We also repeated the entry and exit analyses to see whether there was significant spatial 
sorting in response to the most important environmental policy that occurred during 
our sample period. This policy, known as the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law 
2000 Revision, was officially issued on April 29, 2000. It identified 47 key cities and 
imposed stringent environmental regulations in these cities. We divided the sample into 
these cities versus all others. The results are shown in Online Appendix 6 and do not 
reflect any significant effect of pollution on firm entry or exit in the affected or non-
affected cities. 
Since the sample censors non-SOE firms with less than CNY 5 million in annual 
revenues (“below-scale” firms), this may confound entry measures. To see if this is so, 
we simulate the magnitude of censoring required to substantially change the results. 
Using cross-sectional data available on the full sample of all firms in 2004 when a 
manufacturing census rather than a survey was conducted, we calculate each county’s 
“below-scale” and total firms as a fraction of the total number nationwide. We then 
adjust that county’s observed entry rate in each year by assuming that r% of firms that 
entered nationwide actually became “below-scale.” For each county we weight r by the 
ratio of the county’s fraction of “below-scale” firms relative to fraction of total firms in 
2004. This allows the county-level adjustments to be made based on whether they have 
a disproportionately small or large number of “below-scale” firms relative to other 
counties in 2004. 
For example, suppose that 9% of firms nationwide appeared for the first time in a given 
year. Consider a county that had 0.04% of the nation’s below-scale firms in 2004, 0.05% 
of the nation’s total firms in 2004, and that 8% of its firms appeared for the first time in 
that year. For r equal to 10% (fraction of firms that appeared nationwide that we assume 
moved from “below-” to “above-scale” rather than entering), we would adjust this 
county’s entry rate to be 8% - 9%*0.1*(0.0004/0.0005) = .0728. Having adjusted these 
rates for all years and counties, we re-run the entry regression varying r from 0 to 1 but 
bounding the entry rate to be non-negative. Online Appendix 7 describes the procedure 
in more detail and Online Appendix 8 shows the results for increments of 0.1 for r. 
Instrumented pollution has no significant effect on entry over the entire range of r 
providing suggestive evidence that censoring does not affect the results. 
We modify the exit rate in an analogous manner to test the sensitivity of our exit 
regression to the censoring of “below-scale” firms. That is, we adjust each county’s exit 
rate in a given year by assuming that r% of firms that exited nationwide actually 
became “below-scale” rather than exiting. For each county we again weight r by the 
ratio of the county’s fraction of “below-scale” firms relative to fraction of total firms in 
2004 bounding the exit rate to be non-negative. The results are shown in Online 
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Appendix 9. The results are again insensitive to the value of r over the entire range – 
instrumented pollution has no significant effect on exit. 
5.4 Tests for worker sorting 
It is also possible that workers endogenously select their location based on local air 
quality. High-skilled workers are more productive and generally have a higher 
willingness to pay for better air quality. If this leads to significant sorting of worker skill 
levels across counties, then pollution’s effect on productivity should be attenuated for 
firms with high-skilled workers. To test whether workers sort based on pollution levels, 
we test whether a county’s instrumented pollution in a year affects the fraction of 
workers employed by high- versus low technology firms in that county in that year. We 
classify firms’ technological intensity based on their industry following OECD (2011), 
which classifies industries as high, medium-high, medium-low, and low technology. 
Based on each firm’s employment, we then compute the fraction of workers employed 
in each of these categories in each county-year. Since these classifications are at the 
industry level we must aggregate to the county-year level for this analysis. In addition 
to weather controls, we include county and year fixed effects so that the effects are 
identified by variation within county over time. We cluster standard errors by county to 
allow for spatial and inter-temporal correlation of unobservables within each county. 
Columns (1) through (4) of Table 4 show the results of estimating how instrumented 
pollution affects the fraction of employment in each of these four categories. The effects 
are all insignificant except for the fraction in low-technology industries, which is 
increased by air pollution. This is consistent with low-productivity workers sorting to 
more polluted areas although the effects are small. A one 𝜇𝜇g/m3 increase in PM2.5 
increases the fraction of employment in low-skilled industries by 0.0033 which is only 
0.86% of the average fraction of low-technology employment across counties. To test for 
the robustness of the technology classifications and make sure that a small number of 
firms within each category are not an issue, Columns (5) and (6) repeat the estimation 
combining the two high-technology categories into one category and similarly for the 
two low-technology categories. Instrumented pollution has no significant effect on the 
fraction of employment in either category. 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
5.5 Effect by worker skill level 
We are aware of only four papers that consider the effect of pollution on productivity of 
high-skilled workers and these focus on specific worker categories: Archsmith et al. 
(2018) on umpires, Heyes et al. (2016a) on investors, Heyes et al. (2016b) on politicians, 
and Kahn and Li (2019) on judges. Air pollution is commonly thought to primarily 
affect outdoor workers because of their unfiltered exposure and their holding 
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occupations which are more physically demanding than high-skilled indoor workers. 
However, PM2.5 can permeate indoors making it possible for it to affect indoor workers. 
Our data allow us to offer some evidence by skill level for manufacturing firms in China. 
We categorize firms’ technological intensity based on the four industry categories in 
OECD (2011) and estimate the effect of pollution on productivity separately for the sub-
sample in each category. 
The results are shown in Columns (2) through (5) of Table 5 alongside estimates for the 
full sample in Column (1). The effects are above those of the full sample for the high-
technology firms (elasticity of -0.73) and below for the low-technology firms (elasticity 
of -0.33). This is consistent with higher-skilled workers employed by more 
technologically-intensive firms having a higher marginal effect on productivity than 
lower-skilled workers so that an equivalent level of pollution diminishes absolute 
productivity more for high-technology firms. These results also suggest that the 
previous evidence for specific high-skilled workers extends to manufacturing firms and 
is consistent with evidence that air pollution affects cognitive not just physical effort. 
This suggests that air pollution’s effects extend to a larger portion of economic output 
that includes knowledge workers and services industries. Columns (6) and (7) show 
that this result continues to hold if only two categories of worker skill levels are used. 
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
5.6 Effect on number of workers, capital, and output 
Our estimates capture the effect on productivity conditional on the number of workers. 
Pollution may also affect the number of workers employed. To assess this, we estimate 
Equation (5) with log number of workers in each firm as the dependent variable using 
annual number of days with a thermal inversion as the instrument. The survey data 
capture both permanent and contract employment thereby making it likely we can 
capture annual adjustments in response to pollution. The survey measures end-of-year 
employment so that employment changes due to pollution over the course of a year 
would be captured. 
The results are shown in Column (2) of Table 6. A one 𝜇𝜇g/m3 increase in PM2.5 increases 
employment by 0.51% implying an elasticity of 0.27. Although firms increase 
employment to compensate for some of the productivity loss, it is not enough to offset 
the negative effect on productivity. Moreover, employing additional workers imposes 
costs on firms. We can use the average wage in the sample to produce a ballpark 
estimate of these costs. A one percent increase in PM2.5 increases employment by 0.27%, 
or 0.56 additional workers per firm. The average annual wage per worker in the sample 
is CNY 12,650 (USD 1,664) implying an additional cost per firm of CNY 7,147 (USD 940). 
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Aggregated across all firms this equals CNY 1.14 billion (USD 0.15 billion) annually or 
12.7% of the productivity loss from the 1% increase in PM2.5. 
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
In Column (3) of Table 6, we show the results of estimating Equation (5) with log capital 
as the dependent variable.23 There is no significant effect. Column (4) estimates the 
effect of pollution on log value added. The effect is significant and the elasticity of value 
added with respect to pollution is -0.17. This equals the summed effect of pollution’s 
effect on productivity (-0.44) and its effect on labor supply (0.27) and will also be used 
below in our general-equilibrium simulation. 
5.7 Mitigation of pollution-productivity effect 
As shown above, firms compensate for the reduced productivity that pollution causes 
by hiring more labor. It is useful to know whether high-polluting firms compensate 
more or less than low-polluting firms since this has ramifications for the resulting level 
of pollution and output. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 compare the effect of pollution 
on labor supply for “polluting” versus “clean” firms.24 The effects do not differ 
significantly between the two types of firms. Columns (5) and (6) provide one possible 
explanation for this. “Clean” firms experience a larger negative productivity shock than 
“dirty” firms. While this would imply a greater incentive for “clean” firms to hire more 
workers than “dirty” firms, “clean” firms may be more likely to utilize high-skilled 
labor which is also likely to be in less elastic supply than low-skilled labor. This could 
result in similar effects on hiring for “clean” and “dirty” firms. 
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
Firms may respond to the lower productivity caused by inversions vis-à-vis pollution 
by adjusting their production processes. To test for this we run reduced-form estimates 
relating the number of inversions to productivity distinguishing counties with a large 
number of inversions (above the median) versus low. The results in Online Appendix 
10 show that inversions reduce productivity more in areas with fewer inversions 
consistent with firms in high-exposure regions adjusting their production in response to 
the level of inversions. This also means that our estimates are inclusive of the effects of 
this avoidance behavior. 
Environmental regulations could result in differential effects on firms in different 
industries or locations including due to different strategic responses to these regulations 
(Zou, 2018). However, we are unable to test for these for two reasons. Differential 
effects will only be reflected in our results if they are correlated with thermal inversions. 
                                                          
23 We calculate capital stock using the perpetual inventory method in Brandt et al. (2012). 
24 We define “dirty” and “clean” based on the 3-digit SIC codes in Mani and Wheeler (1997). 
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Moreover, prior to 2008 environmental regulation in China was minimal and the 
policies in place were often unenforced or under-enforced. We suspect prior to this, 
GDP-based promotion criteria for local government officials led them to emphasize 
GDP growth to the exclusion of environmental quality. 
5.8 Explaining productivity dispersion 
To place our results in the context of the larger productivity literature we quantify 
pollution’s role in explaining productivity dispersion across firms (Syverson, 2011). We 
do so using both output per worker and TFP since the latter is commonly used in the 
general productivity literature. We follow Fox and Smeets (2011) in using 𝑅𝑅2, adjusted-𝑅𝑅2, and standard deviation of residuals to quantify the reduction in dispersion. 
Unfortunately, because we must instrument pollution we cannot quantify these for the 
structural equation and instead must rely on generalized 𝑅𝑅2 and generalized residuals 
(Pesaran and Smith, 1994). This understates pollution’s influence because it only 
quantifies the effect of the exogenous shocks to pollution (that due to thermal 
inversions). However, we also show quantifications using non-instrumented pollution. 
These are only suggestive since non-instrumented pollution is endogenous. 
Online Appendix 11 compares the productivity dispersion explained by the weather 
controls and pollution. We quantify this by regressing output per worker and TFP 
respectively on weather controls and pollution incrementally. We do not include firm 
fixed effects in this exercise since our goal is to explain dispersion across firms cross-
sectionally and not just over time.25 The results using the OP and LP approaches for 
estimating TFP are virtually identical. Weather controls explain 4.7 to 6.1 percentage 
points of variance and reduce the spread of residuals by 2.4 to 3.1%. Instrumented 
pollution has only a slight effect on either variance or the residuals. The impact is 
greatest (0.03 percentage points) when explaining output per worker. Thus, while 
pollution is important in explaining overall levels of output it is not an important 
contributor to dispersion in productivity vis-à-vis inversions across firms. Non-
instrumented pollution has a much greater effect (1.5 to 2.5 percentage points’ reduction 
in variance and 0.8 to 1.3% reduction in the spread of residuals) but this is only 
suggestive since it is not exogenous. These effects are smaller than the effects of labor 
quality (7.4 percentage points reduction in 𝑅𝑅2 and a 14.9% reduction in the spread of 
residuals) found by Fox and Smeets (2011). 
 
                                                          
25 Not including firm fixed effects means that even instrumented pollution may be correlated with the 
error term (e.g., due to firm sorting) so this is an added reason to treat these results as only suggestive. 
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6. General-equilibrium effects 
Thus far we have ignored how output affects pollution over time. To incorporate these 
effects we utilize the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1992, 1993). The DICE model is an 
intertemporal general-equilibrium model in which a representative agent chooses 
period-by-period consumption to maximize utility discounted by the rate of social time 
preference subject to an economic constraint and an emissions-climate-economy 
constraint. 
We adapt the model in two ways to suit our purposes. First, rather than modeling the 
global economy we model only China and assume it is a closed economy. While the 
latter is obviously a simplification given that China is a large exporter during our 
sample period, we are interested only in production not demand-side effects. Thus, our 
simplifying assumption is that the consumer is representative of both domestic and 
export consumers. Second, we replace the climate-change dynamics of the original 
DICE model with a pollution production function relating contemporaneous pollution 
to output consistent with our estimating only the contemporaneous effects of PM2.5.
26 
We assume that PM2.5 is created only by the manufacturing sector:
27 Ω(𝑡𝑡) = [𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)]𝜇𝜇(𝑖𝑖), (7) 
where 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡) is the fraction of total output produced by the manufacturing sector and 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) 
is the elasticity of pollution with respect to output in year 𝑡𝑡. 
To estimate 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) we take advantage of China joining the World Trade Organization in 
late 2001 as an exogenous shock to output for firms in China’s coastal regions relative to 
that in its inner regions. This approach of comparing high-and low-exposure regions 
before and after trade liberalization shocks has been widely used in the trade literature 
(e.g., Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005; Verhoogen, 2008; Topalova, 2010). This provides a 
differences-in-differences estimator with counties in coastal regions as a treatment 
group and those in inner regions as a control group: 
Q𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Ι𝑖𝑖>2001Ι𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (8) 
where 𝑏𝑏 indexes counties, Q𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is output in county 𝑏𝑏 in year 𝑡𝑡, Ι𝑖𝑖>2001 is an indicator 
variable set to one in years after 2001 and zero otherwise, Ι𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 is an indicator 
variable set to one if the county is on the coast and zero otherwise, and 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 are county 
                                                          
26 Therefore, the only dynamics in the model are the capital accumulation process. The original DICE 
model also included the dynamics of the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions into concentrations 
consistent with it being a much longer process than PM2.5’s dynamics. 
27 The services sector produces little PM2.5. Our manufacturing data also does not include power plants so 
we are making an implicit assumption that PM2.5 created by power plants scales proportionally with 
manufacturing output. 
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fixed effects. Obtaining estimates, we then form the exogenous predicted values �Q�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖� 
and use them in the second-stage to estimate 𝜇𝜇: Ω𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝜇𝜇Q�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. (9) 
The key identifying assumption for Equation (8) is that the pre-treatment trends are 
parallel for coastal and inner regions prior to China joining the WTO. Online Appendix 
12 plots coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from regressing county-level output 
on year dummies interacted with Ι𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 conditioning on county fixed effects and non-
interacted Ι𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖. The interaction terms (normalized to zero in 2001) show no obvious 
trend prior to 2002 and display an upward trend after 2002. 
Online Appendix 13 reports the estimates of Equations (8) and (9) using data for our 
sample period. The instrument is reasonably powerful and yields an elasticity of 1.43 
for PM2.5 with respect to output which is statistically very significant. The OLS estimate 
is about one-third of this consistent with negative feedback from pollution on output. 
We use this as the value of 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) in 2002. Online Appendix 14 describes how we calibrate 
the other years and other parameters of the model. 
We simulate the model using economy-wide data for China as described in Online 
Appendix 14. Following Nordhaus (1993) we simulate over a sufficient number of 
periods that the outcome over our sample period is not significantly affected by 
endpoint conditions. We found that simulating 100 years is sufficient to stabilize the 
solution for the sample period. Similar to Nordhaus (1993) our chosen parameters result 
in simulated levels of output and pollution that are close to the actual during the 
sample period as discussed in Online Appendix 14. 
Having calibrated the model we then run counterfactuals to assess the general-
equilibrium effects of pollution. We vary 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) slightly to generate a local derivative of 
output with respect to pollution. A 1% decrease in PM2.5 over the sample period 
increases manufacturing output by 0.31% on average over the sample period compared 
to the partial equilibrium increase of 0.17%. The resulting productivity improvement 
would increase the average firm’s value added by CNY 39.7 (USD 5.2) thousand 
annually and increase total value added across all firms by CNY 6.3 (USD 0.8) billion 
annually or 0.043% of China’s GDP. This is robust to 2002 values of 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) ranging from at 
least 1.2 to 1.6.28 Output is more responsive to pollution when general equilibrium 
effects are considered because of the feedback effects: decreased output results in 
somewhat less pollution and thus somewhat more output. Consistent with this, the 
elasticity in the first year (-0.20) is somewhat greater than the partial-equilibrium 
                                                          
28 The absolute level of pollution is greatly affected even though the elasticity of output with respect to 
pollution is not. The absolute level of output, on the other hand, is relatively unaffected. 
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elasticity (-0.17). The elasticity steadily increases to -0.34 by the last year as capital is 
accumulated courtesy of the greater output. 
These results can be used directly to evaluate the general-equilibrium effects of policies. 
For example, a 1% reduction in PM2.5 through other means would increase 
manufacturing output by 0.31%. Equivalently, improvements in pollution-reduction 
technologies such as abatement equipment can also be evaluated (a decrease in 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡)). 
For example, China’s Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan enacted in 2013 
stipulated that by 2017 PM2.5 concentrations should fall by 25%, 20%, and 15% in 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta regions 
respectively29 which are China’s main industrial centers. Using the midpoint of these 
three goals (20%) and scaling our elasticity estimate linearly, the productivity boost 
from reaching this target would be 3.4% (0.47% of GDP) assuming that pollution 
decreases originate from actions other than reducing manufacturing output. This, 
however, assumes that our estimates extrapolate fairly far outside the sample range. 
It is useful to place these benefits in context by quantifying the costs of reducing PM2.5. 
Unfortunately, we are unaware of direct estimates of the costs of reducing PM2.5. The 
best we can do is to rely on indirect measures for other pollutants estimated from policy 
interventions. The most useful estimate comes from the US. Pollution-intensive 
industries in counties subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act lost on average USD 
7.9 billion of output annually relative to counties that were not (Greenstone, 2002). At 
the same time, air pollution declined by roughly 12% more in non-attainment relative to 
attainment counties (Chay and Greenstone, 2005).30 Combining these two estimates, a 
back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that a 1% reduction in pollution costs USD 
0.66 billion. This is a lower bound on the costs because the estimate from Greenstone 
(2002) is a partial equilibrium estimate that does not consider the effect of output on 
pollution. This is 83% of our estimate of the benefits of reducing PM2.5 by one percent 
(USD 0.8 billion annually) although the pollutants differ. 
There are other studies that provide more indirect measures of the costs of reducing 
pollution. All of the pollution-reduction measures taken during the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games decreased PM10 concentrations from 24% to 33% in the city (Chen et al., 
2013; He et al., 2016). Restricting 1% of vehicles in Beijing one-day-per week reduces 
PM10 by 1% (Viard and Fu, 2015). Investments in public transit infrastructure can lower 
air pollution: each one standard deviation in increase in subway density in Beijing 
reduced particulate matter by 2% (Li et al., 2019) and a subway opening decreases 
                                                          
29 Issued by the State Council on September 10, 2013 (http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-
09/12/content_2486773.htm). 
30 This is for “total suspended particulate,” an older measure of particulate pollution but the closest 
measure available at the time to the pollutant we examine. 
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particulate concentrations by 4% around a city center (Gendron-Carrier et al., 2017). 
Derivation of these costs and explanations of the pollutants are contained in Online 
Appendix 15. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Using a large micro dataset on manufacturing firms in China, we estimate the effect of 
air pollution on productivity. To deal with the reverse causality of output and pollution 
and other potential endogeneity issues we take an instrumental variable approach. For 
the effect of pollution on output we use thermal inversions, which are meteorologically 
determined. The approach attenuates the endogeneity bias and indicates a significant 
negative effect of air pollution on productivity. For the effect of output on pollution we 
use the differential effects of China’s entry into the WTO on coastal versus inner regions 
of China. Combining these in a general-equilibrium model we quantify the general-
equilibrium effects of pollution on output. 
Our study shows a significant economic loss in productivity and therefore output in 
China due to air pollution. This also suggests a huge social benefit of improving air 
quality in terms of increasing productivity and total output. Our study contributes to 
the emerging literature on air pollution’s effect on short-run productivity by providing 
comprehensive, nationwide empirical evidence that captures all channels through 
which pollution can affect productivity and taking account of the general-equilibrium 
effects of output on pollution. These estimates can be used directly for short-run effects 
in cost-benefit analyses of broad-based environmental policies. 
Our findings shed new light on the debate about whether environmental regulations 
positively or negatively affect firm competitiveness (Jaffe et al., 1995). Historically, this 
debate has focused on the extent to which decreased competitiveness from 
environmental compliance costs is offset by process innovations that are both cleaner 
and of lower cost. Our results confirm another channel that influences this debate. 
Environmental regulations that decrease air pollution will in turn increase productivity 
and at least partially offset the decreased productivity due to complying. 
Since our identification relies on yearly variation we are unable to estimate long-run 
effects of pollution on productivity. In the long run firms may take steps to respond to 
pollution such as protecting indoor workers or moving to lower-pollution areas to boost 
productivity. Workers also may move in the long run to avoid pollution, especially 
high-skilled workers who have a greater willingness to pay to avoid pollution. We find 
little evidence of such sorting in our short-run results but this may occur over longer 
periods and would attenuate the productivity effects. Future work on these long-run 
effects would be useful. 
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Although we can capture all channels by which pollution can influence productivity, 
we are unable to decompose the exact channels by which pollution lowers productivity. 
Significant effects on productivity per hour would indicate that there are large benefits 
from protecting workers from air pollution while at work. Effects on hours worked 
might indicate exposure to pollution by a worker’s family members in addition to 
workplace exposure. These would be useful avenues for future research. 
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Figure 1: Time trend of air pollution and value added in China (1998 to 2007) 
 
Notes: This graph displays national average of county-level PM2.5 and aggregate value added of 
China’s manufacturing sector from 1998 to 2007. Value added includes all state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and all non-SOEs with sales above CNY 5 million. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for firm-level productivity and county-level pollution data 
  
 
Variables Mean
Standard 
deviation Min Max
Firm
Value added (1,000 CNY) 12,821     23,540     74            366,426   
Employment (person) 207          299          10            3,013       
Capital (1,000 CNY) 14,531     30,872     64            350,801   
Output per worker (1,000 CNY/worker) 88            160          0.13         16,248     
Total factor productivity (OP estimates) 2.91         1.03         -3.23 8.44         
Total factor productivity (LP estimates) 5.38         0.97         0.01         10.03       
Air pollution
Particular matter (PM2.5) (µg/m
3) 53.52 25.46 2.62 134.84
Thermal inversions
Annual days with thermal inversions 156.95 78.75 0.00 333.00
Notes:  Firm-year sample size: 1,593,247 including 356,179 firms. County-year sample 
size: 25,359 including 2,755 counties. Sample period: 1998-2007. Total factor 
productivity are estimates based on Olley-Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) 
instrumenting approaches.
County-year sample
Firm-year sample
Table 2 OLS and 2SLS estimates (effect of air pollution on productivity) and reduced-form estimates (effect of thermal inversions on 
productivity) 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Annual days with inversions -0.0002*** -0.0003*** 0.0300*** 0.0356*** 0.0300*** 0.0356***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
KP F -statistic 5,520 8,249 5,520 8,249
Dependent variable: TFP (OP) TFP (LP)
PM2.5 0.0003 0.0004** -0.0080*** -0.0082*** -0.0049*** -0.0036***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
# firms 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179
Sample size 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247
PM2.5
First stage
 
Notes: All models include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and weather controls (in both stages for 2SLS). Sample period: 1998 - 2007. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F -statistic is the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F -statistic for weak identification in the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
ln(Value added/worker) ln(Value added/worker)
Reduced form
ln(Value added/worker)
2SLSOLS
Second stage
Table 3: 2SLS estimates – tests for firm sorting based on air pollution 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction Fraction
of firms of firms
Dependent variable: entering exiting
Exclude
relocating
Baseline firms
PM2.5 -0.0082*** -0.0124*** 0.0033 0.0016
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0018)
KP F -statistic 8,249 12,377 218 322
Firm fixed effects Y Y N N
County fixed effects N N Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y Y
Clustering Firm Firm County County
Sample size 1,593,247 1,432,765 23,091 22,684
Notes:  Sample period: 1998 - 2007 in Columns 1 and 2; 1998 - 2006 in Column 3 to 
measure exit in the following year; 1999 to 2007 in Column 4 to measure entry from 
the prior year. Columns 1 and 2 are firm-year data; Column 1 includes all firms and 
Column 2 all firms that did not relocate during the sample period. Columns 3 and 4 
are county-year data and aggregate all firms to the county level. All models use 
annual number of days with thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. All models 
include year fixed effects and weather controls in both stages. Models in Columns 1 
and 2 include firm fixed effects and models in Columns 3 and 4 county fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in Columns 1 and 2 and at the county 
level in Columns 3 and 4 and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The KP F -statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F -statistic for weak identification in 
the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
ln(value added per worker)
Firm-year sample County-year sample
Table 4: 2SLS estimates – tests for worker sorting based on pollution 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:
Medium- Medium-
High high low Low High Low
technology technology technology technology technology technology
PM2.5 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0021 0.0033* -0.0012 0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017)
KP F -statistic 207.9 207.9 207.9 207.9 207.9 207.9
County fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustering County County County County County County
Sample size 25,357 25,357 25,357 25,357 25,357 25,357
Fraction of employment
Four categories Two categories
Notes:  All models use annual number of days with thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. All 
models include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and weather controls in both stages. The technology 
intensity definition in Columns (2) through (6) is from https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf. 
We group high technology and medium high technology into high technology into Column (5), and 
group low technology and medium low technology into low technology into Column (6). Sample period: 
1998-2007. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F -statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F -statistic for weak identification in 
the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
Table 5: 2SLS estimates – effect of air pollution on productivity by firm technology level 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable:
Medium- Medium-
Full High high low Low High Low
sample technology technology technology technology technology technology
PM2.5 -0.0082*** -0.0119** -0.0134*** -0.0061** -0.0060*** -0.0128*** -0.0061***
(0.0014) (0.0056) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0017)
KP F -statistic 8249 365.6 1796 2495 3902 2178 6348
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# firms 356,179 24,652 102,699 97,918 130,910 127,351 228,828
Sample size 1,593,247 112,792 467,768 435,842 576,845 580,560 1,012,687
Share of sample size (%) 100.0 7.1 29.4 27.4 36.2 36.4 63.6
ln(value added per worker)
Four categories Two categories
Notes:  All models use annual number of days with thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. All models 
include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and weather controls in both stages. The technology intensity 
definition in Columns (2) through (7) is from https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf. We group high 
technology and medium high technology into high technology into Column (6), and group low technology 
and medium low technology into low technology into Column (7). Sample period: 1998-2007. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F -
statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F -statistic for weak identification in the first stage (Kleibergen and 
Paap, 2006). 
Table 6: 2SLS estimates – effects of air pollution on productivity, employment, capital, and 
value added 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(value added ln(number ln(value
Dependent variable: per worker) workers) ln(capital) added)
PM2.5 -0.0082*** 0.0051*** -0.0003 -0.0032**
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0015)
KP F -statistic 8,249 8,249 8,249 8,249
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y Y
# firms 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179
Sample size 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247
Notes:  All models use annual number of days with thermal inversions as first-stage 
instruments. All models include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and weather 
controls in both stages. Sample period: 1998-2007. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F -
statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F -statistic for weak identification in the first 
stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
Table 7: 2SLS estimates – effects of air pollution on employment and productivity split by “clean” 
versus “polluting” firms 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:
Full "Polluting "Clean Full "Polluting "Clean
Sample firms" firms" Sample firms" firms"
PM2.5 0.0051*** 0.0056*** 0.0047*** -0.0082*** -0.0046* -0.0104***
(0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0017)
KP F -statistic 8,249 2,488 5,804 8,249 2,488 5,804
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
# firms 356,179 117,312 238,867 356,179 117,312 238,867
Sample size 1,593,247 530,827 1,062,420 1,593,247 530,827 1,062,420
ln(number workers) ln(value added per worker)
Notes:  All models use annual number of days with thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. All 
models include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and weather controls in both stages. The 
pollution intensity definition in Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) is from 
http://www.oecd.org/industry/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/2076285.pdf. Sample period: 
1998-2007. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic for weak identification 
in the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
Appendix 1: summary statistics for firms with a single year of data versus all firms in the 
sample 
 
 
 
  
Variables Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation Difference
Value added (1,000 CNY) 12,407     23,203     6,967       17,316     5,440         
Employment (person) 201          295          124          226          77              
Capital (1,000 CNY) 14,091     30,574     8,314       25,660     5,777         
Labor productivity (1,000 CNY/worker) 3.89         1.02         3.77         1.10         0.12           
Particular matter (PM2.5) (µg/m
3) 69.71 22.56 72.11 24.51 -2.40
Number observations
Notes:  All firms sample includes 477,496 firms and single-year sample includes 121,317 firms. Sample 
period: 1998-2007.
All firms Single-year firms
1,714,564 121,317
Appendix 2: 2SLS estimates (effect of pollution on productivity) comparing three major 
economic centers to rest of country 
  
 
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable:
3 economic All
Baseline centers other
PM2.5 -0.0082*** -0.0061** -0.0058**
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0027)
KP F-statistic 8,249 3,036 2,154
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y
# firms 356,179 200,933 155,249
Sample size 1,593,247 913,848 679,391
ln(value added per worker)
Notes:  All models include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and 
weather controls in both stages. Column 1 includes all firms; Column 
2 includes all firms in Jing-Jin-Ji, Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River 
Delta economic centers; Column 3 includes all firms not in these three 
centers. Sample period: 1998-2007. Number of observations in 
Columns 2 and 3 do not equal those in Column 1 due to the small 
number of firms that switch locations during the sample period. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F-statistic is the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic for weak identification in the first 
stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).
Appendix 3 2SLS estimates (effect of air pollution on productivity) – robustness to clustering of standard errors and regional time 
trends 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Baseline
Year FE +
By firm By Year-by Year-by- Provincial provincial 
and county- county- By region province quadratic quadratic
year year county FE FE trends trends
PM2.5 -0.0082*** -0.0082** -0.0082** -0.0082** -0.0119*** -0.0132*** -0.0056*** -0.0085***
(0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0008) (0.0015)
KP F -statistic 8,249 162 164 129 1,331 1,802 30,374 10,273
Cluster by firm Y N N N Y Y Y Y
Cluster by firm and county-year N Y N N N N N N
Cluster by county-year N N Y N N N N N
Cluster by county N N N Y N N N N
# firms 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179 356,179
Sample size 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,593,247
ln(value added per worker)
Time fixed effects and trendsClustering of standard errors
Notes:  Sample period: 1998 - 2007. All models use annual number of days with thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. All 
models include firm fixed effects and weather controls in both stages. Columns 1 through 4 also include year fixed effects, Column 
5 year-by-region fixed effects, Column 6 year-by-province fixed effects, Column 7 provincial-specific quadratic time trends, and 
Column 8 year fixed effects along with provincial-specific quadratic time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in 
Columns 1 and 5 through 8, at the firm and county-by-year level in Column 2, at the county-by-year level in Column 3, at the 
county level in Column 4, and are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F -statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald rk F -statistic for weak identification in the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
  
Appendix 4 2SLS estimates (effect of air pollution on productivity) – robustness to weighting, sample composition, and functional 
form 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:
Non- Single- Log
Baseline Weighted winsorized Raw data plant function
PM2.5 -0.0082*** -0.0088*** -0.0088*** -0.0108*** -0.0087***
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Log PM2.5 -0.5225***
(0.0902)
KP F -statistic 8,249 1,911 8,783 7,878 8,070 7,265
Cluster by firm Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weighting by value added N Y N N N N
Winsorized Y Y N N N Y
# firms 356,179 356,179 379,349 388,277 344,453 356,179
Sample size 1,593,247 1,593,247 1,746,850 1,767,917 1,499,158 1,593,247
Notes:  All models use annual number of days with thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. All 
models include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and weather controls in both stages. Sample period: 
1998-2007. Column 3 uses non-winsorized sample, Column 4 uses all data including the unreliable 
observations, and Column 5 uses only firms with a single plant location. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level and are reported in parentheses. The regression is weighted by value added  in column 2. In 
Columns 1 through 6, PM2.5 is measured in levels and in Column 7 in log form. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The KP F -statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F -statistic for weak identification in the first 
stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
ln(value added per worker)
Appendix 5: coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for 100 placebo tests reassigning 
pollution data randomly to a different year’s productivity and weather data 
 
Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from 100 placebo 2SLS estimates (effect of air 
pollution on productivity) using annual number of days with thermal inversions as an 
instrument. Placebo tests performed by randomly reassigning one year’s productivity data to a 
different year’s pollution and weather data. 
  
Appendix 6: 2SLS estimates – tests for firm sorting based on air pollution (key versus non-key 
cities under the Key City policy) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:
Full Key Non-key Full Key Non-key
sample cities cities sample cities cities
PM2.5 0.0033 0.0045 0.0052 0.0016 -0.0008 0.0007
(0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0025)
KP F -statistic 218.4 81.5 131.8 322.2 116.1 188.4
County fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustering County County County County County County
Sample size 23,091 4,582 18,509 22,684 4,495 18,189
Fraction of firms entering Fraction of firms exiting
Notes:  Sample period: 1998 - 2007 in Columns 1 and 4; 1999 to 2007 in Columns 2 and 3 to 
measure entry from the prior year; 1998 - 2006 in Columns 4 and 5 to measure exit in the 
following year. All columns are county-year data and aggregate all firms to the county level. 
All models use annual number of days with thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. 
All models include year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and weather controls in both 
stages. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and reported in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic for 
weak identification in the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
Appendix 7: Sensitivity of entry and exit regressions to censoring of “below-scale” firms 
This appendix describes how we modify the entry and exit rates to test the sensitivity of the 
entry and exit regressions to censoring on below-scale firms. 
Using the 2004 census data, determine the number of below-scale firms in county 𝑖𝑖 as a fraction 
of below-scale firms nationwide in 2004: 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (A1) 
where 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 is the number of below-scale firms in county 𝑖𝑖 in year 2004. The unadjusted entry rate 
for county 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 is: 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (A2) 
where 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of firms that appeared in the sample in county 𝑖𝑖 in moving from year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of firms in county 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡. 
We modify each county’s entry rate to assume that 𝑏𝑏 percent of firms that appeared nationwide 
(∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) moved from being “below- scale” to being “above-scale” rather than entering. We apply 
this adjustment proportionally to each county based on its fraction of “below-scale” firms in 
2004 bounding the rate to be non-negative: 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 �0, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑟∗∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �. (A3) 
We modify the exit rate in an analogous manner to test the sensitivity of the exit regressions to 
truncation for “above-scale” firms. The unadjusted exit rate for county 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 is: 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (A4) 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of firms that disappeared from the sample in county 𝑖𝑖 in moving from 
year 𝑡𝑡 to year 𝑡𝑡 + 1. 
We modify each county’s exit rate to assume that 𝑏𝑏 percent of firms that disappeared 
nationwide (∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) became “below-scale” firms rather than exiting. As with the modified entry 
rate, we apply this adjustment proportionally to each county based on its fraction of the nation’s 
“below-scale” firms in 2004 bounding the rate to be non-negative: 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 �0, 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑟∗∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �. (A5) 
We then re-estimate our exit regressions varying the value of 𝑏𝑏 between 0 and 1. 
 
 
Appendix 8: sensitivity of entry regression to censoring of “below-scale” firms 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dependent variable:
r=0 r=0.1 r=0.2 r=0.3 r=0.4 r=0.5 r=0.6 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1
PM2.5 0.0030 0.0028 0.0027 0.0027 0.0023 0.0019 0.0017 0.0019 0.0022 0.0021 0.0019
(0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025)
KP F -statistic 77.84 77.84 77.84 77.84 77.84 77.84 77.84 77.84 77.84 77.84 77.84
County fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustering County County County County County County County County County County County
Sample size 22,895 22,895 22,895 22,895 22,895 22,895 22,895 22,895 22,895 22,895 22,895
Fraction of firms entering (modified)
Notes:  Sample period: 1999 to 2007 to measure entry from the prior year. Dependent variable is county entry rate modified as described in Online 
Appendix 7 for different values of r . County-year data aggregating all firms to the county level. All models use annual number of days with 
thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. All models include year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and weather controls in both stages. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F-statistic is the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rk F-statistic for weak identification in the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
Appendix 9: sensitivity of exit regression to censoring of “below-scale” firms 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dependent variable:
r=0 r=0.1 r=0.2 r=0.3 r=0.4 r=0.5 r=0.6 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1
PM2.5 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0020 0.0019 0.0017 0.0014 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016)
KP F -statistic 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6 142.6
County fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustering County County County County County County County County County County County
Sample size 22,493 22,493 22,493 22,493 22,493 22,493 22,493 22,493 22,493 22,493 22,493
Fraction of firms exiting (modified)
Notes:  Sample period: 1998 to 2006 to measure exit in the next year. Dependent variable is county exit rate modified as described in Online 
Appendix 7 for different values of r . County-year data aggregating all firms to the county level. All models use annual number of days with 
thermal inversions as first-stage instruments. All models include year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and weather controls in both stages. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F-statistic is the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rk F-statistic for weak identification in the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
Appendix 10: effect of inversions on productivity (reduced-form estimates distinguishing 
counties with high and low numbers of inversions) 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Dependent variable
Inversions -0.0003*** -0.0004*
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Inversions*1(high-inversion region) 0.0002**
(0.0001)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,593,247 1,593,247
Number of firms 356,179 356,179
ln(Value added per worker)
Notes:  All models include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and 
weather controls. Sample period: 1998-2007. "High-inversion regions" 
in Column (2) are defined as counties with annual number of days 
with an inversion above the median. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The KP F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic for 
weak identification in the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
Appendix 11: dispersion in firm productivity (output per worker and TFP) explained by weather and pollution 
  
 
Increment Adj. Increment %
R
2
explained R
2
explained SD reduction
Output per worker
Constant -          -          1.0100    
Add weather controls 0.0608    0.0607    0.9789    -3.09%
Add instrumented pollution 0.0610    0.0003    0.0610    0.0003    0.9787    -0.01%
Add non-instrumented pollution 0.0856    0.0249    0.0856    0.0249    0.9658    -1.33%
TFP (OP )
Constant -          -          1.0322    
Add weather controls 0.0521    0.0520    1.0050    -2.64%
Add instrumented pollution 0.0521    0.0000    0.0521    0.0000    1.0049    0.00%
Add non-instrumented pollution 0.0673    0.0152    0.0672    0.0152    0.9969    -0.80%
TFP (LP)
Constant -          -          0.9679    
Add weather controls 0.0470    0.0469    0.9448    -2.38%
Add instrumented pollution 0.0470    0.0000    0.0469    0.0000    0.9448    0.00%
Add non-instrumented pollution 0.0632    0.0163    0.0632    0.0163    0.9367    -0.86%
Notes:  R 2 , adjusted-R 2 , and standard deviation of residuals explained by weather controls and instrumented 
pollution in regressions of output per worker and TFP (using OP and LP methods to instrument for unobserved 
productivity). Generalized R 2 , generalized adjusted-R 2 , and standard deviation of generalized residuals 
explained by non-instrumented pollution in regressions of output per worker and TFP.
Appendix 12: Test of parallel trends for coastal versus inner regions before China joins the WTO 
in late 2001 
 
Notes: 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating a regression of county-level 
output on county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and interactions between year fixed effects and 
coastal counties: Q𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖Ι𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
 
  
Appendix 13: OLS and 2SLS estimates (effect of output on pollution) using effect of China 
joining WTO on coastal versus inner regions as an instrument   
  
 
  
(1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
First stage
Dependent variable: ln(Value added)
Coast*post 2001 0.0574***
(0.0147)
KP F -statistic 15.3
Second stage
Dependent variable:
ln(Value added) 0.0048*** 1.4317***
(0.0012) (0.3666)
County fixed effects Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y
Sample size 25,357 25,357
 
ln(PM2.5)
Notes: Both models include county and year fixed effects (in 
both stages for 2SLS). Sample period: 1998-2007. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The KP F-
statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic for weak 
identification in the first stage (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
Appendix 14: General-equilibrium model setup, solution, calibration, and data 
Model setup 
Following Nordhaus (1992) (his Equation (2)), the model maximizes the sum of discounted 
utility for a representative consumer with a population 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) using a logarithmic utility function 
of per-capita consumption �𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡)�: 𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡) ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒[𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡)](1 + 𝜌𝜌)−𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1 , (A1) 
where 𝜌𝜌 is the annual rate of social time preference. 
Output is a standard Cobb-Douglas production function in exogenously-given technology �𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)�, capital �𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)�, labor, and a pollution damage function �Ω(𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃�. The pollution damage 
function can capture both effects that we find in our partial-equilibrium analysis: changes in 
productivity and changes in labor supply (fraction of the population that works). That is, 
population is exogenous but labor supply is not:1 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = Ω(𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)1−𝛾𝛾, (A2) 
where 𝛾𝛾 is the elasticity of output with respect to capital and 𝜃𝜃 is the elasticity of output with 
respect to pollution. This is Nordhaus (1992) Equation (3) with the pollution damage function 
corresponding to his climate factor function. 
We replace Nordhaus (1992) Equations (7) through (13) which model the dynamic relationship 
between output and temperature with a pollution production function that relates 
contemporaneous pollution to output: Ω(𝑡𝑡) = [𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡)]𝜇𝜇(𝑖𝑖), (A3) 
where 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) is the elasticity of pollution with respect to manufacturing output. We assume that 
only the manufacturing sector produces pollution and 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡) is the fraction of total output from 
manufacturing. 
Gross output is divided between investment 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) and aggregate consumption 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡): 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡), (A4) 
and per-capita consumption is: 𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)⁄ . (A5) 
The law of motion for capital is: 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) = (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡 − 1) + 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡), (A6) 
where 𝛿𝛿 is the rate of capital depreciation. Equations (A4), (A5), and (A6) follow Nordhaus 
(1992) Equations (4), (5), and (6) exactly. 
                                                          
1
 To see this, suppose that pollution affects both productivity and fraction of population working: 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛺𝛺(𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃1𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)𝛾𝛾�𝛺𝛺(𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃2𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)�1−𝛾𝛾. This is Equation (A2) with 𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃1 + 𝜃𝜃2(1 − 𝛾𝛾). 
 Model solution 
Substituting Equation (A3) into (A2) we obtain: 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = �?̃?𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛾𝛾)�𝜂𝜂(𝑖𝑖), (A7) 
where 𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡) = 1 [1 − 𝜃𝜃𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡)]⁄  and ?̃?𝐴(𝑡𝑡) = �𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃𝜇𝜇(𝑖𝑖)𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)�. 
Substituting Equation (A7) into (A4) and then solving for 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡): 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) = �?̃?𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛾𝛾)�𝜂𝜂(𝑖𝑖) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡). (A8) 
Using Equation (A6) for 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) and substituting it into (A8): 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) = �?̃?𝐴(𝑡𝑡)[(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡 − 1) + 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)]𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛾𝛾)�𝜂𝜂(𝑖𝑖) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡). (A9) 
Now substituting this for 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) in Equation (A1) we can transform the optimization problem to a 
choice of investment period-by-period: 𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 �Γ�𝐼𝐼(𝑖𝑖)�𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖) � (1 + 𝜌𝜌)−𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1 , (A10) 
where Γ[𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)] = �?̃?𝐴(𝑡𝑡)[(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡 − 1) + 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)]𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛾𝛾)�𝜂𝜂(𝑖𝑖) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡). 
We use the Matlab function fmincon to solve Equation (A10) over 100 periods (1996 to 2096) 
choosing the optimal investment path given the initial capital stock (in 1995). We simulate 100 
years to ensure that endpoint conditions do not unduly impact the outcome over the sample 
period. As in Nordhaus (1993), the parameter values described below allow us to match actual 
output and pollution reasonably well. The plot below compares actual and simulated values of 
output over the sample period (actual values are based on the variable “real GDP at constant 
2011 national prices” from the Penn World Tables (Zeileis, 2019 and Feenstra et al., 2015)). 
Average annual emissions in the data are 135,721 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 𝑚𝑚3⁄  compared to an average simulated 
value of 152,672 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 𝑚𝑚3⁄  per year. 
To simulate the general-equilibrium effects of a change in non-manufacturing pollution we 
adjust 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) slightly and re-optimize the model to obtain a derivative of output with respect to 
pollution. We then compute the average change in output and pollution over the sample period 
to calculate an elasticity. The estimate was similar for a range of variations in both directions 
(𝜇𝜇(2002) ranging from 1.2 to 1.6). 
 
 Parameter calibration 
To calibrate the model from 1996 to 2017 taking 1995 capital stock as given we follow the 
approach in Nordhaus (1992) adapted to China’s economy during our sample period: 
1) The consumer’s rate of time preference (𝜌𝜌) is set to 0.04 which is a value commonly used in 
macroeconomic simulations (e.g., Chang et al., 2015). 
2) The labor share (1 − 𝛾𝛾) is set to 0.575 based on the average labor share in China from 1995 to 
2017 based on the variable “share of labor compensation in GDP at current national prices” 
in the Penn World Tables (Zeileis, 2019 and Feenstra et al., 2015). 
3) The elasticity of output with respect to pollution (𝜃𝜃) is set to our partial-equilibrium 
estimate of -0.17. 
4) The depreciation rate (𝛿𝛿) is set to 0.09 based on Brandt et al. (2012) from which our firm 
productivity data is taken. 
5) The elasticity of pollution with respect to output (𝜇𝜇) is set to 1.43 in 2002 based on our 
differences-in-differences estimates as described in the paper. We assume that this value 
changes smoothly from 1996 to 2096 (the last year of our simulation) passing through this 
value in 2002 and ending at 1.0. This is to account for China’s projected improvements in 
emissions control over time. 
6) The share of total output comprised of manufacturing (𝜆𝜆) is set year-by-year based on the 
share of GDP in first, second, and tertiary industries (China Statistical Yearbook, 2018) from 
1996 to 2017. After 2017 we assume that it remains constant at that value. 
 
Exogenous data 
Population (𝑃𝑃): actual and projected population by the United Nations from 1996 to 2096 
(https://population.un.org/wpp/). 
Augmented TFP �?̃?𝐴�: the 1996 value is based on the variable “residual TFP” in the Penn World 
Tables (Zeileis, 2019 and Feenstra et al., 2015). We assume that it grows at 7.96% per annum 
based on estimates in Brandt et al. (2012) using manufacturing sector data from 1998 to 2007. 
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Appendix 15: Derivations of estimates for pollution reduction costs 
Chay and Greenstone (2005): The first stage of the paper’s 2SLS estimation implies that total 
suspended particulates (TSPs)2 declined by 12% more in non-attainment than in attainment 
counties in response to the US Clean Air Act. The estimates use data from 1970 and 1980. 
Chen et al. (2013): Estimates that the Air Pollution Index (API) dropped 33% due to the 
regulations implemented during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.3 The API is primarily attributable 
to PM104 in 2008. 
Fu and Gu (2017): Estimates the elasticity of the API with respect to toll rates across Chinese 
cities. Using data from 2011 to 2012 they find an elasticity of -0.15. The API is primarily 
attributable to PM10 during this time. To reduce the API by 1% the toll rate needs to increase on 
average from CNY 0.40 to 0.437. 
Gendron-Carrier et al. (2017): Finds that particulate concentrations (measured by AOD) drop by 
4% in a 10-kilometer radius around a city center following a subway system opening. The paper 
uses a sample of 171 cities across Asia, Europe, North America, South America, Australia, and 
Africa between August 2001 and July 2013.  
Li et al. (2019): Estimates the effects on the API and Air Quality Index (AQI)5 of all subway 
expansions in Beijing from 2008 to 2017. A one-standard deviation increase in subway density 
(by their measure) decreases the API/AQI by 2%. The API is primarily attributable to PM10 
during this time period and the AQI to PM2.5. 
Greenstone (2002): From 1972 to 1987, non-attainment counties that were subject to regulation 
under the US Clean Air Act lost approximately $75 billion of output (in 1987 dollars) in 
pollution-intensive industries relative to attainment counties. This is a lower bound on the costs 
since it is a partial-equilibrium estimate ignoring output’s effect on pollution. Adjusting this for 
inflation using the Consumer Price Index this is $118.8 billion in 2002 dollars (roughly the 
midpoint of our sample). This is $7.9 billion annually on average over the fifteen years. The 
pollutants include carbon monoxide (CO), O3, sulfur dioxide (SO2), and total suspended 
particulates (TSP). 
He et al. (2016): The first-stage of the paper’s 2SLS estimation estimates that the air quality 
regulations during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games6 reduce PM10 concentrations by 24 to 26%. 
Viard and Fu (2015): Beijing’s API, which is primarily due to PM10 during the sample period, 
falls 21% in response to restricting 20% of cars one-day-a-week in the short run. This suggests 
reducing pollution by 1% requires restricting 1% of vehicles one-day-per week. 
                                                          
2 TSP was a cruder measure of suspended particulates before the PM10 and PM2.5 measures were introduced later; and is the closest 
to the pollutant measure we examine during our sample period. 
3 These measures included plant closures and relocations, furnace replacements, introduction of new emission standards, and 
stringent traffic controls. 
4 This is particulate matter smaller than ten micrometers in diameter. 
5 China reported the API through 2013 after which it began reporting the more sophisticated AQI. The primary pollutant in the AQI 
index is PM10 and in the API index PM2.5. 
6 These were wide-ranging and included installation of abatement equipment on power plants, replacement of all high-emissions 
public transit vehicles, shutdown of many factories, increase in vehicle gas prices, and relocation of a major steel plant. 
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